On Human Nature by Roger Scruton

Author:Roger Scruton [Scruton, Roger]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781400884667
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2017-02-14T00:00:00+00:00

1Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).

2Martin Buber, Ich und Du (1923), English translation, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Scribner’s, 1937).

3Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment.”

4I have expounded both arguments at greater length in Modern Philosophy (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994; reissued, London: Bloomsbury, 2010), chapters 5, 20, and 28. Hegel’s argument is expanded, adapted, and varied in Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).

5See G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, introduction, part A, chapter 4.

6Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, part 2, chapter 1.

7I have adapted the argument of Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 44–45. See the many online discussions of “the experience machine.” For Joseph Butler, see his Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (London, 1729), Sermons 1 and 9.

8See the discussion in Thomas Nagel, “Sexual Perversion,” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 39–52.

9Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

10Denis Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure and Human Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

11See the imaginative argument in J. J. Valberg, Dream, Death, and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

12G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957).

13See Brie Gertler’s entry “Self-Knowledge” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for an up-to-date (2015) survey: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/.

14There is a third possibility, namely, weakness of will, topic of a debate that I am here avoiding. See Donald Davidson, “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?” in Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 21–42. When I express an intention to do x but do not do it, this cannot be because I made a mistake about my own intentions. It is for this reason that weakness of will is a philosophical problem: Exactly what goes wrong when it happens?

15J. R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

16P.M.S. Hacker, Human Nature: The Categorial Framework (London: Wiley and Sons, 2007).

17Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

18See, for example, the discussions of cultural fetishism in Theodor Adorno’s writings, notably “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening” (1938), reprinted widely, e.g., in A. Arato and E. Gebhardt, eds., The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), pp. 270–299.

19Boethius, Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis, chapter 3; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 19.

20Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (New York: Cornell University Press, 1963).

21See the discussion of the identity conditions for works of art in Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

22This has been denied by Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Parfit’s approach is rebutted by David Wiggins, in Sameness and Substance Renewed.

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